

RECEIVED

FEB 01 2000

5

MR. DAVID DeROSA: My name is David DeRosa,

6 D-e-R-o-s-a. I live here in Chicago. I just

7 got back into town today from the East Coast.

1...

8 So I just found out about this hearing today,

9 but I don't think I got much more warning than

10 most of the other people here.

11 I am here to represent many groups,

12 most of which I am relatively certain exhibit

13 greater aggregate common sense and fewer

14 conflicts of interest than the DOE in setting up

15 this rather farcical hearing. I feel certain

16 that many more people in Chicago and in the

17 surrounding area would be interested in talking

18 about this issue than are represented in this

19 room, which shows a severe failure on the DOE's

20 part. I am sure that was intentional and that

21 the empty seats in this room are designed to

22 show that the public isn't concerned at all

23 about this problem.

2

24 I just glanced through the report.

1 That's a really funny thing to say about

2 something this heavy, but I was looking through

3 the table of contents for a couple things. One

4 thing I didn't see in there, although I wasn't

5 sure that I knew exactly where to look, was the

6 issue of insurance and the liability for nuclear

7 waste and all the accidents that will occur

8 during the shipment of this material shipping it

9 over dedicates. I think this is the main reason

...2

10 that utilities around the country and most of
11 the people who've created high-level waste are
12 interested in seeing this facility, because the
13 federal government is supposed to take over the
14 liability. And under Price Anderson, all the
15 liability magically goes away. It's like
16 legislative, you know, it's like instant tort
17 reform. Imagine your worst catastrophe 20 years
18 down the line and the utilities, assuming they
19 still exist, won't be liable for it.

3

20 I am really interested in trying to
21 figure out how many accidents and what sorts of
22 accidents are going to happen over the course of
23 this waste being shipped through urban areas,
24 through farmland, through -- you know, over
1 major rivers, through tunnels. I am sure a lot
2 of that is covered in the report, through the
3 usual government method of risk analysis, a
4 process that was famously described by Bill
5 Ruckelshouse with the EPA, as being somewhat
6 like a captured spy. You know, you take the
7 numbers, you torture them and make them say
8 whatever you want them to. EPA has always been
9 good at that, minimizing risks.

...1

10 One of the previous speakers this
11 evening mentioned or actually more alluded to
12 the massive protests that are going to be
13 happening in this country very possibly as
14 people find out that this stuff is going to be

...1

EIS001618

15 entering their communities. And they are going
16 to say, well, we didn't get a public hearing. I
17 haven't seen the full plans for the public
18 hearing. I doubt there is even 43 of them
19 planned in every state that's going to be having
20 these materials transport through them, let
21 alone every community or every county or how
22 everyone wants to.

23 So all these people are going to be
24 suddenly caught by surprise and they may very
1 well react in unpredictable ways, which is not
2 something that risk analysis is good at,
3 although it likes to pretend to.

4

4 I did find a fascinating section
5 called the impacts of acts of sabotage on page
6 6-33, which considered the impacts of successful
7 sabotage attempts on a cask, the casks that most
8 of us have never gotten to see and don't really
9 know how they'll work. We certainly don't know
10 in what ways they've been tested. But don't
11 worry because for the ones that are being
12 shipped on trucks, and the analysis estimated
13 that a sabotage event occurring in an urbanized
14 area could result in the population dose of
15 31,000 person REM, which would cause an
16 estimated 15 fatal cancers among the population
17 of exposed individuals.

18 This number is so farcical that the
19 idea that a successful -- I mean, these are

4...

EIS001618

20 casks made out of uranium. So we can look at
21 research that is going on into servicemen as
22 well as native populations in Iraq that have
23 been dealing with depleted uranium shells and
24 probably find higher cancers than that. But the
1 idea that a successful sabotage event in a city
2 like Chicago might cause 15 cancers is the sort
3 of disinformation that one really associates
4 with the Soviet Union denying any of the deaths
5 from Chernobyl, rather than an actual seriously
6 peer reviewed government document on the
7 environmental impact of transportation
8 problems.

9 And it goes down to 2.4 fatal cancers
10 if it happens out in a rural area, so the
11 farmers should feel totally at ease that the
12 food they sell, I assume that's been irradiated,
13 won't in any way cause cancers.

14 So these ideas, this idea of who will
15 be liable for these problems, coupled with the
16 vastly underestimated risk, which I'm sure no
17 actual insurance company that had to generate a
18 policy would have allowed its actuaries to put
19 out such ridiculous numbers. They'd be either
20 fired or sent back to math reeducation camps.

5

21 But it really shows the value of human
22 life in an agency that is willing to consider
23 adding one more nuclear waste site in the
24 country and requiring every -- an interim waste

...5

1 site, so far as I know, at Yucca Mountain. They
2 don't have the permanent one done so they want
3 to put the interim one up above it. And then
4 once we've parked enough nuclear waste there,
5 the pressure will just build, Nevadans will fold
6 and we will just have to dump it into the salt
7 mines.

...4

8 But it is not 78, as Dave Kraft said,
9 because really every community that this waste
10 goes through is a potential, at least interim,
11 storage site. Not only actually interim during
12 the time its transiting, but any one of these
13 casks could stop, break open, in many other ways
14 be breached. And I like the way this section
15 actually talks about a sabotage event cannot be
16 characterized as a random event. So we are
17 pretty much assuming they are going to happen.

18 DR. LAWSON (Facilitator): 30 seconds,
19 please.

20 MR. DeROSA: And the question is only, who
21 is liable for that and how will the utilities
22 that have foisted this problem on the American
23 public be answerable for it? And the way this
24 document is written, and I hope more people in
1 the public really hold the DOE's feet to the
2 fire on this, the answer is currently, really
3 not at all.

4 Congratulations.